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ities and levels of service.
-A newly created Regional Development and Infrastructure Agency,
located in each of the state's air basins,
would eliminate the artificial lines
dividing functionally separate singlepurpose regional agencies. This entity
would not be a new layer of government
but a merger of existing efforts that are
now ineffective because of a functional
bias toward single goals.
-The report recommends elimination
of the geographic division of air pollution control efforts within the air basins
established by the Air Resources Board.
This approach reflects a simple recognition that air flows freely within each of
the basins without regard to legal jurisdictional boundaries.
-The report recommends the elimination of fiscal incentives which encourage sprawling land development requiring public investment in inefficient
infrastructure and which deny needed
services and infrastructure to poorer
communities.
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MAJOR PROJECTS:
A Summary of California's Alcohol
and Drug Abuse Laws (June 1989) was
released to the public by SOR and
Senator John Seymour in December
1989. The report was the result of SB
2599 (Seymour) (Chapter 983, Statutes
of 1988), which established a Five-Year
Master Plan to Reduce Drug and
Alcohol Abuse in California. The report
sets forth a compilation and consolidated overview of California laws pertaining to drug and alcohol abuse. The
report presents brief summaries of applicable statutes in non-technical language,
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and is intended to be an only an introduction to these statutes.
As background information, the
report noted that a recent finding by the
California Department of Alcohol and
Drug Programs indicates that approximately 2.2 million Californians have a
problem with alcohol abuse and 2.1 million persons in the state use illicit drugs
or use drugs inappropriately. During
1987, 2,488 people died in California as
a direct result of alcohol abuse and
2,000 died as a result of drug abuse.
Problems caused by substance abuse
cost the state approximately $17.7 billion per year in lost worker productivity,
health and medical costs, motor vehicle
accidents, violent crimes, social
responses, and fire losses.
The report discussed the six major
statutes that provide the statutory
authority governing the regulation and
enforcement of alcohol and controlled
substances in California, including the
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act, the
California Control of Profits of
Organized Crime Act, the California
Major Narcotic Vendors Prosecution
Law, the California Imitation Controlled
Substance Act, and the Sherman Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Law.
The report then listed various categories of laws relating to alcohol and
drug abuse, including laws relating to
use, possession, and soliciting; driving
under the influence; sale, dispensing,
and administering; adulterating/poisoning food, drink, or water; labeling and
advertising; professions and employment; education: the administration of
justice; treatment and prevention; and
alcoholic beverage licensing and taxation.
Changes in Our Telephone Regulation: Competition at the Crossroads
(September 1989). In response to a
request by Senator Herschel Rosenthal,
Chair of the Senate Energy and Public
Utilities Committee, the SOR released
this report, which provides a comprehensive review of the growth of competition in the telecommunications industry and discusses the response of the
California Public Utilities Commission
(PUC) to the regulatory challenge it
faces.
The traditional system of telecommunications regulation, commonly referred
to as rate of return regulation, is intended to assure that four important goals
are met: assuring just and reasonable
rates; preserving the ability of the utility
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enterprise to attract capital on reasonable terms; assuring high quality service
and adequate facilities; and preventing
abuse of monopoly power and undue
discrimination among customers. Rate
of return regulation consists of four
basic steps: determining the rate base
(the stock of capital facilities that the
company uses to provide services);
determining the firm's cost of capital;
adding the operating expenses and
depreciation to the rate base; and determining customer rates so as to provide
utility stockholders with a fair rate of
return on their investment. According to
the report, the benefits of this type of
regulation include the provision of
below-cost basic telephone service
while allowing the development of an
extremely high quality telecommunications system. Also, the traditional regulatory scheme has allowed for vigorous
oversight of the local exchange carriers
(LECs) and provided opportunities for
customer protection. However, because
of ongoing changes in both technology
and government policies, both of which
have fostered competition in a variety of
services, the PUC is examining the
desirability and feasibility of establishing an alternative regulatory framework
for regulating LECs.
In the past several years, three major
proposals for dramatic regulatory
change have been submitted for the
PUC's consideration by Pacific Bell,
GTE California, and the PUC's Division
of Ratepayer Advocates (DRA).
Although each proposal is different,
each entails a significant change in regulation, and each offers increased freedom and flexibility to LECs to enter
competitive business. Under each plan,
traditional rate of return regulation
would be abandoned for incentive regulation, which encourages the utility to
act more like an unregulated business
and vigorously seek methods to improve
productivity and also allows the utility
the freedom to enter new markets. The
danger of such a system, according to
the report, is that the utility still maintains monopoly power in some areas,
which could result in anticompetitive
behavior. Competitors and consumer
groups have opposed the plans offered
by Pacific Bell and GTE California, citing the lack of safeguards and the
unprecedented flexibility that has
increasingly been given the two telephone companies.
In late 1987, the PUC commenced
what Senator Rosenthal characterized as
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"expedited proceedings" to, in essence,
restructure the entire regulatory structure of local telephone companies in
California. Concerned that these proceedings could dramatically lessen the
opportunity for greater telecommunication competition, and in light of the fact
that the Senate Committee on Energy
and Public Utilities anticipated lengthy
debate on these issues, Senator
Rosenthal requested SOR to review and
evaluate the proposed options and report
back so that the committee could proceed on a more informed basis.
In addition to describing the three
submitted proposals, the SOR's report
also considered a then-pendilg August
17, 1989 recommendation of a PUC
administrative law judge (ALJ), which
proposed replacing the present rate of
return regulation with an incentive system based on price caps. These caps
would limit rate increases to an inflation
factor, and reduce rates based on the
phone company's gains in productivity.
The telephone company would have
new flexibility to enter competitive markets. [EDITOR'S NOTE: The August
recommended decision was subsequently adopted by the PUC on October 12,
1989; see infra agency report on PUC
and CRLR Vol. 9, No. 4 (Fall 1989) p.
133 for further information.]
After reviewing the proposals of
Pacific Bell, GTE California, the DRA,
and the recommendation of the ALJ,
and in light of the PUC's ongoing investigation into changing telecommunications regulation, SOR's report made a
number of general conclusions and recommendations, including the following:
-In order to provide the proper
framework for the LEC and its competitors to compete, changes must be made
to the regulatory system. Part of that
regulatory change is the need to give the
telephone companies new flexibility in
competitive markets.
-Competitive safeguards need to be
adopted to prevent anticompetitive
behavior on the part of the monopoly
side of the LEC business.
-The PUC must reaffirm the importance of the DRA and establish a role
for DRA in the new regulatory framework.
-Enactment of a profit sharing mechanism is desirable. According to the
report, profit sharing provides an incentive to the LEC while protecting
ratepayers. The disadvantage of profit
sharing is that it creates the incentive in
certain circumstances for the LEC to

incur costs to reduce or avoid profit
sharing. Therefore, the use of profit
sharing implies that an appropriate level
of regulatory oversight is necessary to
prevent the LEC from carrying out
activities that reduce profit sharing.
-The PUC must retain strict oversight
over monopoly services.
-The PUC should adopt comprehensive ex parte rules for the Commission's
routine use. According to the report,
competitors are concerned about the
lack of rules because of the resources
that LECs can devote to discussing
issues with Commissioners and staff.
-The PUC should streamline its complaini pioceduie in order Lo facilitate thc
rapid and fair handling of complaints
and reduce the barriers to filing complaints.
-The legislature should consider
allowing appeals of PUC decisions to be
taken to a court other than the California
Supreme Court, as it, as a matter of
practice, reviews very few PUC decisions. Expanded judicial review is desirable as the number of disputes grows
due to the increased competition.
-The legislature should consider
establishing an independent DRA and
ALJs. Representatives of consumer
groups and competitors are concerned
that being under the direct control of the
Commission limits the independence of
these two parties.
-The legislature should also require
the PUC to define "competition".
According to the report, such a definition is important if regulation for competitive services will be different than
that for monopoly services.
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